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Introduction

Hosting mega events have traditionally been a privilege of developed nations, but
since 2008 developing countries have successfully obtained the right to host those
international competitions. For example, China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics, India
the 2010 Commonwealth Games, South Africa the 2010 World Cup, Russia the 2014
Winter Olympics and Brazil the 2014 World Cup. In addition, Russia is selected to host
the 2018 World Cup and Brazil the 2016 Summer Olympics (Peeters, Matheson, &
Szymanski, 2014). Although this seems to be a positive step for the developing nations,
there are speculations concerning the real benefits and expenses those games generate.
Events such as the World Cup give the incentive to create infra-structure, promote
international exposure and increase tourism and business alliances. It is also a way to
speed investments in certain areas and infra-structure that otherwise would be forgotten
or would not passed through the political process (Barclay, 2009).
On the other hand, the opportunity cost is high. Investing in infra-structure for a
mega event means a reduction in other public services, greater government borrowing or
higher levels of taxation (Barclay, 2009). This issue is recognized by the public and a
proof of that are the several protests that occurred in Brazil before and during the 2014
World Cup. Although in 2007, when Brazil was chosen to be the 2014 World Cup host
the Brazilians were supportive, the huge amount spent in stadiums enraged them a few
years later. Besides that, developing nations tend to have an inefficient and corrupted
government, an extra challenge when it comes to investments.
There are several studies that try to weight the benefits and costs of mega events.
Some of them are mentioned in this paper, such as Barclay (2009) and Peeters, Matheson
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and Szymanski (2014). However this research aims to analyze if it would be
recommended for a developing country to host a FIFA World Cup by comparing the
results from South Africa and Brazil. With the data from both countries, the intention is
to determine if the benefits of hosting the FIFA World cup exceeds the costs of it.

II.

Comparing South Africa and Brazil

The two countries being analyzed in this study have many similarities, allowing
us to compare their effects with less bias. To start, both South Africa and Brazil are
leading political and economic powers of their continents, Africa and South America,
respectively. They also have very similar economies which comprise of a big agricultural
and mining sector, as well as a well-developed manufacturing division. They are both
considered upper middle income countries by the World Bank. Brazil had in 2013 a gross
domestic product (GDP) of USD 2.246 trillion and gross national income (GNI) of USD
11,690 per capita. In the same year, South Africa’s economy resulted in a GDP of USD
350.6 billion and a GNI per capita of USD 7,190.
Regarding their politics, both countries are relatively new democracies, with their
left-wing political parties in power since 1994 in South Africa and since 2003 in Brazil.
The problem is, however, that according to the World Bank Governance Indicators, both
countries have low levels of corruption control. In 2013, South Africa and Brazil had a
control of corruption estimator of -0.12, which ranges between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher
numbers indicating better governance. In terms of government effectiveness, South
Africa has a higher indicator than Brazil. The average between 2002 through 2013 was
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0.52 and -0.07 for South Africa and Brazil respectively (The World Bank Group, 2015).
Overall the BRICS1 countries have similar government characteristics, as seen in Table I.
The poor governance indicators from most developing countries can compromise
the benefits the country would receive from the mega-event. As seen in Figure I, the
World Bank indicators for BRICS countries and Qatar go against what is consider being
the optimal characteristics of good governance. When dealing with high amount of
spending and numerous projects, good governance plays a more important role than
democracy, which can fail due to gridlock and extremist parties like as happens with the
BRICS.

Figure 1 - Characteristics of good governance (Sheng, 2009)

III.

Effects in South Africa

South Africa became the first African country to host the World Cup. According
to the Deputy Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Musa Nene, the South African government
hoped the World Cup would be a “catalyst for development and investment in
infrastructure, targeting the creation of employment and economic growth, rather than
1

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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funding just a one-off event”. Besides that, the event could possibly enhance the
country’s international image and the sense of national pride among the South Africans
(OECD Observer & Nene, 2013).
a. Economic impact
According to the Department of Sport and Recreation of South Africa, the
government spent a total of USD 3.12 billion on transportation, telecommunication and
stadia. Although the investment was high, it provided great organizational lessons for the
developing country, such as how to budget, manage and implement new mega projects
and to improve communication between different spheres of the government (OECD
Observer & Nene, 2013).
It was also reported by the national government that the 2010 World Cup
generated a positive economic impact: it contributed USD 509 million to the 2010 real
GDP. Moreover, it created USD 769 million in benefits for households, of which USD
228 million designated to low income families (OECD Observer & Nene, 2013). The
event also generated a direct impact on labor: 130,000 jobs were created through
constructions in stadia and infrastructure and hospitality (Sport & Recreation South
Africa (SRSA), 2012).
The numbers for the direct impact of the event seem very satisfactory, but very
debatable. Usually, those results are calculated through the direct impact of stadia
construction, and from total commercial activity during the event. The problem is that
this calculation approach uses “gross” numbers instead of “net” ones. Consumers are
usually inflexible regarding leisure expenditure, meaning they might only be substituting
their spending in regular leisure for the World Cup tickets. The reallocation of spending
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means there is barely effect on local community, and consequently, the calculations for
the direct impact might be exaggerated (Barclay, 2009).
b. Infrastructure
For a developing country, a mega event can be a huge benefit, as it accelerates the
speed with which infrastructure projects are approved. South Africa invested USD 364
million in ports of entry, USD 1.35 billion in train stations, airports and roads, and USD
156 million in broadcast technology. The country also spent USD 135 million on safety
and security, resulting in 40,000 new police officers that remained in the force even after
the event. (Sport & Recreation South Africa (SRSA), 2012). All these investments can
be enjoyed by the population after the event.
South Africa’s expectations regarding the World Cup are exactly what most
countries, especially developing ones, aim to achieve when hosting a mega event. The
problem is that those expectations are not usually met. Nhlanhla Musa Nene declared in
the same interview, that the maintenance of some stadia has been an issue, and they have
been looking for ways to make them more sustainable.
The areas where the investment occurred are also questionable. Train stations and
roads were improved around airport and stadia surroundings, which are usually already
well developed regions. Because the government tries to allocate the tourists in lowcrime parts of the cities, it ends up investing in areas that would not require as much
rehabilitation as others (Matheson & Baade, 2004).
c. Tourism
One of the expectations of the South African government was that the World Cup
would boost the tourism industry in the country. The sector accounted for 8.7% of the
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GDP in 2009 and accounted for 575 000 direct and 825 000 indirect jobs (Department of
Tourism, 2013).
It was predicted that approximately 450,000 spectators and tourists would visit
South Africa for the World Cup, but only two thirds of the expectation was met. The
government estimated that around 306,600 tourists visited the country for the event,
spending USD 444 million, mainly in shopping, food and accommodation. Even with the
visitors average spend in 2010 being 24% higher than the previous years, based purely on
the numbers, it can be said that South Africa recovered only a tenth of the USD 3.12
billion invested for the World Cup (Sport & Recreation South Africa (SRSA), 2012).
A study by Thomas Peeters, Victor Matheson and Stefan Szymanski (2014)
calculated that around 220,000 visitors from non-Southern African Development
Community (SADC) countries attended the 2010 World Cup. They also reported that:
“Taking into account the possible dynamic and legacy effects over the following months
and years, this number increases to around 300,000 extra arrivals. While this constitutes a
substantial effect (around 12% additional growth for the year), this implies that South
Africa spent more than USD 13,000 per visitor. Of course, tourism growth is not the only
channel by which a host country may recoup its investments, and indeed some eventrelated investments might create beneficial economic effects. However, even if we take a
very conservative view and only consider the cost of stadium construction, our most
realistic estimates still point to a cost of over USD 4,400 per additional non-SADC
visitor.”
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As seen, the amount spent by the government to boost the tourism sector in the
country might not have been worth it. South African Tourism Strategic Research Unit
reported that the tourism arrival to South Africa grew only by 3.3% on 2011, while the
global growth was 4.4% (South African Tourism Strategic Research Unit, 2012).
A positive view however is the fact that there was an increase in the number of
visitors coming from countries that generally have ties to South Africa, which means the
country was able to improve their international image (Peeters, Matheson, & Szymanski,
2014).
d. Social impact
For a country that has been under Apartheid for 46 years, an event that promotes
national unity and pride could potentially be very beneficial. The FIFA studies on South
African residents and tourists revealed that 91% of the South Africans believe the event
united the population of the country (Sport & Recreation South Africa (SRSA), 2012).
One issue with this research is that it was done in August 2010, right after the event. The
long term effects cannot be measured through it. Another study claims the World Cup
was an opportunity for the country to showcase its effort in becoming a leader in the
continent.
Moreover, it was a way for the government to enhance its credentials by
delivering a successful event and a chance for the South Africans to demonstrate
patriotism for a month. On the other hand, there were threats of xenophobia at the end of
the event (Ndlovu Gatsheni, 2011). That contradicts the belief that the World Cup truly
united the population.
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One can say that the South African population might have been benefited in terms
of work skills. For those who participated in facilities construction, they acquired skills
that can be used for future construction projects.
South Africa was also aided from FIFA World Cup Legacy Trust. FIFA has
contributed USD 100 million to the trust, of which USD 80 million are designated to
social projects linked to football, education and development and humanitarian work.
There was no academic research measuring the real impact of this project found by the
time this paper was being written.

IV.

Effects in Brazil

Unlike South Africa’s World Cup, there are not many studies and official reports
about the Brazilian Word Cup, as it just happened in June 2014. Thus, the approach for
the analysis of the 2014 World Cup was different. For this section, the main focus are on
estimations the government released so far, and the impacts on the economy are hard to
measure even at short term.
When Brazil was confirmed as a host in 2007, the economy was performing
satisfactorily. The real GDP growth was 6.1% and inflation averaged about 3.6%,
according to the International Monetary Fund. A year later, the country’s economy was
affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The government expenditures continued to rise and
so did the inflation. By 2014, the Brazilians became furious with the costs generated by
the World Cup.
Even with the high expenditure the event generated and the negative opinion from
the population, the government believes the 2014 World Cup was a success.
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a. Economic impact
In June 10, 2014, FIFA reported that the Brazilian government had, at that point,
spent USD 15 billion with the World Cup (FIFA, 2014). Later on, in December 2014,
Federal Court of Accounts of Brazil (TCU) published the country totalized USD 9.63
billion on expenses related with the mega-event. USD 2.64 billion was designated to
urban transportation and USD 3.02 billion with stadia. The airport expenses added up to
USD 2.34 billion (Brandão, 2014).
A study conducted by the Economic Research Institute Foundation (FIPE)
determined that the World Cup would inject USD 13.43 billion in the overall Brazilian
economy. The estimation for the tourism sector alone was expected to be around USD 3
billion, generated by the 3.7 million domestic and foreign tourists during the event (João
Saldanha Open Media Centre, 2014). The same study also estimated that the World Cup
created close to 1 million jobs, of which 710,000 were permanent jobs and 200,000
temporary. Of this total amount, approximately 50,000 workers entered the tourism sector
directly (João Saldanha Open Media Centre, 2014).
Vicente Neto, President of Embratur (Brazilian Tourism Institute), revealed that
hosting the cup was essential to put the country on the international spot. Between 2003
and 2013, Brazil “climbed 10 positions in the ranking of the International Congress and
Convention Association (ICCA), from 19th to 9th in the world in number of conferences
and conventions hosted. The total number of events held in Brazil increased from 62 to
315 (and the number of cities hosting events increased from 22 to 54) during that period,
the result of a decentralization policy adopted to attract international events” (João
Saldanha Open Media Centre, 2014).
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The government also believes the World Cup enabled the small businesses to earn
USD 223 million during the event and with the infra-structure construction
(EMBRATUR, 2014).
The reports published by the government do not mention how those numbers were
calculated, so it is important to take into consideration there might be calculating the
gross direct impact of the infra-structure investments and consumption by the tourists,
without accounting for how the locals reallocated their leisure spending. As nicely
written by Peeters, Matheson, and Szymanski, “most of the spending by local residents
on the sporting event does not generate new economic activity but simply reallocates
spending within the economy”.
b. Infrastructure
According to FIFA, a host country needs to provide either eight, ten or twelve
stadiums (FIFA, 2014). The Brazilian government opted to have twelve stadiums. Even
considering that Brazil is known as the country of football, having to invest in infrastructure for twelve different cities was very costly. The choices for the host cities are
also debatable. For example Brasilia, the country’s capital, reconstructed its stadium and
increased its capacity to 71,000 people. However, none of the city teams are part of the
division A of the Brazilian Soccer Series and the stadium is most likely to be underused.
It might be argued that the stadium can be used for concerts and other cultural events, but
this will not necessarily pay for the stadium maintenance expenses. Same issues might be
encounter by Manaus and Cuiabá’s soccer infra-structure.
Regarding the airports, the Federal Court of Accounts of Brazil (TCU) reported in
June 2014 that only 10 out of 26 of the constructions under Infraero, Brazil's national
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airport authority, were completed by February 2014 (Tribunal de Contas da União, 2014).
In fact, there are still airports under construction, such as Tancredo Neves International
Airport in Belo Horizonte, MG and Viracopos International Airport in Campinas, SP.
As for the transportation infra-structure projects, most of them were delayed.
From the 34 proposals, 20 of them did not even have 50% of its expenses paid for
(Tribunal de Contas da União, 2014).
It is important to also notice that in most host cities, the area where the stadium is
located is already considered to be safe and well developed. That means investments
occurred in regions of the city that did not deeply need renovations. An example is
Maracanã Stadium in Rio de Janeiro, RJ. It is located in the north region of the city. It
might not be the safest part, but it serves as residence for middle/upper middle income
families and it is easily accessed by the train, subway and numerous city buses. From the
Brazilian host cities, São Paulo might be considered the exception for that rule. The new
stadium, Arena Corinthians, is located in a more remote part of the city and residence for
low income families. However, the improvements in the area increased land value, which
forced families to move out of the stadium surroundings (Souza, 2014).
c. Tourism
Brazil was expecting to welcome around 600,000 foreign visitors. Preliminary
data shows that 484,483 foreign tourists entered the country between June 1 and 20,
which represents 121% increase comparing to the first 20 days of May. This number also
reflects an increase of 42% in relation to June 2012. The Central Bank estimated that
those tourists spent, until June 18, 2014, USD 365 million (EMBRATUR, 2014).
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Also on the positive side, the hotel sector in the 12 host cities saw an increase of
45% on the expected occupancy rate for the first week of the World Cup. The Forum of
Brazilian Hotel Operators (FOHB) anticipated 240,000 hotel rooms would be booked, but
as of June 11, an extra 100,000 hotel rooms were booked in the country (João Saldanha
Open Media Centre, 2014).
The revenue generated by the tourists represents only 2.5% of the USD 15 billion
invested by the government. Even considering Brazil might receive more international
tourists in the next few years, as suggested by Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011), the
amount invested to receive a new tourist might not be worth it. The study also reminds
that there are only gains from tourist arrival in the three years immediately after the event
(Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2011).
d. Social impact
The Brazilian government claims that there were USD 7.3 million invested in
Pronatec Tourism, a governmental program that trained more than 160,000 Brazilian
nationals to receive domestic and foreign tourists (João Saldanha Open Media Centre,
2014). This knowledge can be reused for the 2016 Summer Olympics as well as for the
tourism sector.
However, investing in educational programs and infra-structure was not enough to
please the Brazilians. Riots and strikes occurred around the country prior and during the
World Cup. Many ended up in violence and confrontations with the police, resulting in
injured participants and reporters. Protesters complained about the corruption and
government expenditure with the World Cup. Their main criticism was the contrast
between the spending in the mega-event compared to health and education. In 2013,
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Brazil spent USD 34 billion in education and USD 36 billion in health. Both together
comprise 8.6% of the total government expenditure in 2013. Expenses in health and
education increased in 2014, but only represented 8.4% of the total expenditure
(Controladoria-Geral da União, 2014).
Although the health and education spending were higher than the expenses with
the World Cup, Brazilians realized that the opportunity cost was big. The country still
needs basic investments on education and health before being able to afford soccer infrastructure.

V.

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

When the Brazilians started protesting about the World Cup and the government
expenditure, all kinds of criticism against the event arose, including negative
commentaries about FIFA.
The main debate regarding the international organization was about the
requirements it imposed for countries willing to host the World Cup. The requisites were
said to be unnecessary. Most requirements published in FIFA’s “Football Stadiums –
Technical recommendations and requirements” and “Regulations – 2014 FIFA World
Cup Brazil” are about the stadium safety, specifications and game rules. It is hard to
judge those specifications without a visual analysis of how absurd they can be.
On the other hand, it is relevant to see what FIFA is publishing as the possible
economic impact on the host countries. As Peeters, Matheson and Szymanski (2014)
stated:
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“There is a clear conflict of interest for a sporting organization to publish an economic
impact study when that organization will be using any estimated economic gains as
bargaining chip for the host government to supply large taxpayer subsidies for the event.”
FIFA states that hosting the World Cup can have benefits such as improving
country’s infrastructure, increasing commercial activity and enhancing partnerships. They
reported that the 2010 World Cup “generated total revenue of USD 3,655 million for
FIFA (excluding ticketing revenue) and incurred total expenses of USD 1,298 million”
(FIFA, 2011). They also announced that the 2014 World Cup created revenue of USD
4,826 million and total cost of USD 2,224 million. Both cases the events generated profit
and according to the organization, this amount is later distributed to football clubs and
used in other FIFA events.

VI.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Just as in South Africa, the Brazilian officials reported the 2014 World Cup as a
success. They believe the event was a huge opportunity for foreign visitors to learn about
Brazil, the culture and its people. Both countries were about to be exposed internationally
and to accelerate the investments on infra-structure in the host cities.
South Africa invested USD 3.12 billion on transportation, telecommunication and
stadia. In return, the 2010 World Cup generated USD 509 million to the 2010 real GDP.
It also created USD 769 million in benefits for the households. Brazil went bigger: it
spent USD 15 billion on the 12 host cities infra-structure. The impact on GDP is still
unknown, as there is not many reports released by the government on the World Cup. But
the Economic Research Institute Foundation estimated the event expenses would inject
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USD 13.43 billion in the overall economy. For both cases, one must take into
consideration those are gross numbers and they do not account for the reallocation of
spending by locals.
The biggest legacy left by the World Cup are the transportation and
telecommunications infra-structure (Sheng, 2009). South Africa and Brazil have very
inefficient governments, and if it was not for the mega-event, these investments would
not happen so quickly. However, the locations where those investments occurred are
mostly well developed and safe areas and they are definitely not the areas that needed the
most rehabilitation.

Regarding tourism, both countries received less visitors than

expected. Tourists spending returned 10% and 2.5% of the total expenditure on the
World Cup for South Africa and Brazil, respectively.
Brazil and South Africa consider a huge benefit for the population the fact that
they invested in tourism related courses and that this knowledge can be used later in the
tourism industry. Moreover, the population can enjoy better transportation and airports
facilities that would not probably have been improved if it were not for the event.
As seen, both countries spent a lot on specialized sports infra-structure and on
operations for the event but the World Cup was not able to generate enough financial
gains. This is generally true in most cases international mega events, as discussed by
Peeters, Matheson and Szymanski (2014). The hope that the World Cup can increase
future tourists’ arrivals must also be analyzed. As Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011)
estimated, there is no lasting impacts on tourism after the event. Number of international
visitors only increases for the following three years.
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Probably the most significant impact on a developing country is the opportunity
cost related to the World Cup. The investments with sport infra-structure are too high,
and could have been invested in education and health, sectors that those two developing
countries desperately need to improve.
The next hosts of the FIFA World Cup are also developing countries: Russia and
Qatar. They were not able to measure if it is worth it or not for them to be hosting the
event, but both can certainly learn a lot from Brazil and South Africa. The biggest
problem is that, as the two previous hosts, Qatar and Russia have not very efficient
governments. Qatar has higher corruption control and effectiveness that the other three
countries, but still the high amount being spent by the government leaves room for
embezzlement of public funds.
In general, one can say the World Cup can bring benefits to a developing country,
especially in terms of speeding investments and project management know-how for the
government. On the other hand, the benefits can easily disappear because of the corrupted
and inefficient governments most developing countries have. They end up spending way
more resources than needed and planned, just as what happened to both Brazil and South
Africa.
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Appendix
Table I
Estimates of Governance Indicators by the World Bank (The World Bank Group, 2015)
Brazil
Estimate
Control of Corruption
Government
Effectiveness
Political Stability *
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Voice and
Accountability

Estimate

Russian
Federation
Average
20022013
2012
-0.93
-0.99

Average
20022012
-0.03

-0.12

-0.07

-0.08

-0.41

-0.10
0.11
-0.29

-0.28
0.07
-0.12

0.45

0.37

2013

China
Average
20022013
2012
-0.55
-0.35

India
Average
20022012
-0.45

-0.56

-0.36

-0.05

-0.19

-0.99
-0.30
-0.86

-0.75
-0.37
-0.78

-1.22
-0.34
0.04

-1.19
-0.47
-0.10

-0.78

-1.01

0.40

0.41

South Africa
Average
20022013
2012
0.25
-0.12

Control of Corruption
Government
0.05
-0.03
0.52
Effectiveness
-0.50
-0.55
-0.07
Political Stability *
-0.24
-0.31
0.55
Regulatory Quality
-0.42
-0.46
0.09
Rule of Law
Voice and
-1.59
-1.58
0.61
Accountability
*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

2013

Qatar
Average
20022013
2012
1.03
1.24

0.43

0.65

1.07

-0.06
0.41
0.13

1.06
0.44
0.75

1.22
0.74
1.04

0.58

-0.70

-0.86

